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Will the Real Party in Interest Please Stand Up?
Florida Statutes Section 627.7262 as Amended
In 1978 Florida Statutes section 627.72621 was declared unconsti-
tutional in Markert v. Johnston2 as an invasion of the Florida Supreme
Court's rulemaking authority. The statute prohibited joinder of motor
vehicle liability insurance companies at the commencement of lawsuits
against insured persons, but also provided for possible joinder of the
insurer at a later stage in the proceedings.$ Therefore the court deter-
mined that the statute involved procedural aspects of trial and was in
1. FLA. STAT. § 627.7262 (1977) read:
Nonjoinder of Insurers.
(1) No motor vehicle liability insurer shall be joined as a party defendant
in an action to determine the insured's liability. However, each insurer
which does or may provide liability insurance coverage to pay all or a por-
tion of any judgment which might be entered in the action shall file a
statement, under oath, of a corporate officer setting forth the following
information with regard to each known policy of insurance:
(a) The name of the insurer.
(b) The name of each insured.
(c) The limits of liability coverage.
(d) A statement of any policy or coverage which said insurer
reasonably believes is available to said insurer filing the state-
ment at the time of filing said statement.
(2) The statement required by subsection (1) shall be amended immedi-
ately upon discovery of facts calling for an amendment to said statement.
(3) If the statement or any amendment thereto indicates that a policy or
coverage defense has been or will be asserted, then the insurer may be
joined as a party.
(4) After the rendition of a verdict, or final judgment by the court if the
case is tried without a jury, the insurer may be joined as a party and judg-
ment may be entered by the court based upon the statement or statements
herein required.
(5) The rules of discovery shall be available to discover the existence and
policy provisions of liability insurance coverage.
2. 367 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1978).
3. FLA. STAT. § 627.7262(3) (1977).
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violation of Article II, Section 3, of the Florida Constitution.4
Prior to this 1976 statute, joinder of liability insurers in actions
against the insured tortfeasor was permitted as a result of the
landmark Florida Supreme Court decision in Shingleton v. Bussey.5
This case established that a direct cause of action' against insurers in
motor vehicle liability insurance coverage cases inures to injured per-
sons as third party beneficiaries of the insurance contract. The court
declared this to be the result of the prevailing public policy of Florida.'
The legislature's first attempt to reverse this direction of the court was
struck down by the Markert decision. Apparently determined not to be
thwarted, the legislature re-enacted Florida Statute Section 627.7262,8
albeit revised,9 in an attempt to cure the prior constitutional defects.
4. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3 provides: "The powers of the state government shall
be divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to one
branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless
expressly provided herein."
5. 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
6. The court relied upon rule 1.210(a), of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides for joinder of parties. See Russell v. Orange County, Florida, 237 So.
2d 192 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Kephart v. Pickens, 271 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1972)(holding that the insured is an indispensable party in such
actions).
7. Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 715.
8. FLA. STAT. § 627.7262, (Supp. 1982) (effective October 1, 1982). On Apr. 7,
1982, during the fourth special session of the 1982 Legislature, the Revised Insurance
Code was passed by unanimous vote in both Houses. HousE COMMITTEE ON INSUR-
ANCE, STAFF REPORT, 1982 Ins. Code Sunset Revision (HB4F; As Amended by HB
10G), at 4 (1982) [hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT].
9. FLA. STAT. § 627.7262 (Supp. 1982) now provides:
Nonjoinder of insurers.
(1) It shall be a condition precedent to the accrual or maintenance of a
cause of action against a liability insurer by a person not an insured under
the terms of the liability insurance contract, that such person shall first
obtain a judgment against a person who is an insured under the terms of
such policy for a cause of action which is covered by such policy.
(2) No person who is not an insured under the terms of a liability insur-
ance policy shall have any interest in such policy, either as a third party
beneficiary or otherwise, prior to first obtaining a judgment against a per-
son who is an insured under the terms of such policy for a cause of action
which is covered by such policy.
(3) Insurers are affirmatively granted the substantive right to insert in lia-
2
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Joinder of liability insurers as codefendants has been the subject of
debate for well over a decade in this state. On the one hand, insurance
and defense counsel vigorously oppose joinder of the liability insurer
(the company) in actions against their insureds (the tortfeasors), and
therefore support the amended statute. Their principal objection to
joinder of the insurer centers on the supposedly negative impact on the
jury of knowledge of the defendant's insurance coverage. On the other
hand, plaintiffs' counsel just as vigorously favor joinder of the liability
insurer, and therefore oppose the amended statute. Their principal con-
tention is that the insurance company investigates the case, hires the
attorneys, controls the negotiations, settlements and litigation, and has
a direct financial interest in the outcome. Therefore, it is argued, the
liability insurer is a real party in interest and should be included in the
lawsuit.
Further debate on the joinder issue has occurred between the legis-
lature and the judiciary, as evidenced by the re-enactment of this non-
joinder statute in response to the Market decision. These legal argu-
ments involve the separate powers of the legislature and the judiciary,
and are based on the nebulous distinction between substantive and pro-
cedural law.
This article focuses on the history of these arguments and the pub-
lic policy and constitutional issues involved. The amended statute is ex-
amined in light of these issues, and an attempt is made to answer the
current question of whether the statute will withstand judicial scrutiny
under the substantive-procedural test.10
bility insurance policies contractual provisions that preclude persons who
are not designated as insureds in such policies from bringing suit against
such insurers prior to first obtaining a judgment against one who is an
insured under such policy for a cause of action which is covered by such
policy. The contractual provisions herein authorized shall be fully
enforceable.
10. The current questions of whether the statute can be applied retroactively,
and whether retroactive application of the statute violates a plaintiff's constitutional
rights are not within the scope of this article.
5891
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Development Of The Law
Prior to Shingleton, Florida followed the majority view" which
prohibits maintenance of a cause of action directly against the insurer
until the tortfeasor's liability is established.12 At common law, the join-
der of the insurer was often denied on the ground that an action ex
contractu cannot be joined with an action ex delicto13 In most jurisdic-
tions today, however, denial of direct actions against the liability in-
surer is generally based on "no action" or "nonjoinder" clauses con-
tained in the insurance policies.1 4 Generally, unless the policy
specifically provides for direct action against the liability insurer, or is
construed to so provide, direct action by the injured party is only per-
mitted by statute.1 5
The Shingleton court hurdled the obstacles of both a "no action -
nonjoinder" clause in the policy 6 and prior decisions which had refused
to recognize the injured persons as third party beneficiaries of the in-
surance contract.17 The court recognized that the majority of jurisdic-
11. See 8 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4861 (Rev. 1981).
12. Artille v. Davidson, 126 Fla. 219, 170 So. 707 (1936), overruled in Shin-
gleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969); Hayes v. Thomas, 161 So. 2d 545 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Thompson v. Safeco Ins. Co., 199 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1967).
13. See, e.g., Jennings v. Beach, 1 F.R.D. 442 (D. Mass. 1940); Conwell v. Hays,
103 W. Va. 69, 136 S.E. 604 (1927); Ellis v. Bruce, 215 Iowa 308, 245 N.W. 320
(1932); Baggett v. Jackson, 244 Ala. 404, 13 So. 2d 572 (1943).
14. See 8 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 11.
15. For a discussion of direct action statutes see 8 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 11;
Comment, The Louisiana Direct Action Statute, 22 LA. L. REV. 243 (1961); Com-
ment, The Insurer as Party Defendant in Automobile Accident Cases, 1953 Wis. L.
REV. 688. Direct action legislation was introduced in both houses of the 1969 Florida
Legislature. Fla. S. 468, Reg. Sess. (1969) was tabled May 6, 1969. Fla. H.R. 1120,
Reg. Sess. (1969) died in committee June 6, 1969. Comment, Civil Procedure: Judicial
Creation of Direct Action Against Automobile Liability Insurers, 22 U. FLA. L. REV.
145, 146 n.12 (1969).
16. The insurance contract provided that: "No action shall lie against the Com-
pany . . . until the amount of the obligation of the Policyholder . . . shall have been
finally determined by judgment after trial. . . . This policy shall not give any right to
join the Company in any action to determine the liability of an insured person or or-
ganization." Brief for Federation of Insurance Counsel and Florida Defense Lawyers
Association, amici curiae at 9, Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
17. Artille v. Davidson, 126 Fla. 219, 170 So. 707 (1936)(under an indemnity
4
Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 5
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss3/5
F Sts2 65
7:1983
tions sustained such clauses as a bar to joinder in actions to determine
the insured's liability. Nonetheless, after emphasizing Florida's public
policy favoring elimination of multiplicity of suits, the court construed
the policy restriction to grant to the insurer only the right to assert
nonliability; the policy restriction did not grant the right to assert non-
joinder.18 The court further reasoned that securance of motor vehicle
liability insurance "is an act undertaken by the insured with the intent
of providing a ready means of discharging his obligations that may ac-
crue to a member or members of the public as a result of his negligent
operation of a motor vehicle. . . ... Finding this intent, the court de-
termined that motor vehicle liability insurance is "amenable to the
third party beneficiary doctrine"20 by operation of law.
After thus rejecting the insurance company's assertion that the no
action clause prohibited joinder, the court accepted the appellate
court's analysis and conclusion that the insurer is a real party in inter-
est in litigation brought against the insured.2 1 The appellate court
reached this decision after taking notice of the policy provisions
whereby the insurance company (1) reserves the right to control litiga-
tion against its insured, (2) is obligated to defend the litigation, and (3)
will be liable for any resulting assessment of damages up to the policy
policy, no action could be maintained by a third party since no breach of contract
which would create in the insured a right to maintain an action on the policy); Hayes v.
Thomas, 161 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (contention that a liability
policy obtained pursuant to Florida's Financial Responsibility Act, FLA. STAT. ch. 324
(1967) permitted maintenance of a direct action against the insurer rejected); Thomp-
son v. Safeco Ins. Co., 199 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1967)(court noted
Florida does not recognize the third party beneficiary doctrine under automobile liabil-
ity insurance policies in the absence of a policy provision).
18. Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 718.
0 19. Id. at 716.
20. Id. Appellate courts soon expanded this rationale to other forms of liability
insurance. Duran v. McPherson, 233 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (Shin-
gleton applied to professional liability insurance); Shipman v. Kinderman; 232 So. 2d
21 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970)(Shingleton applied to medical malpractice insur-
ance); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 231 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1970)(Shingleton applied to homeowners liability insurance). Finally in Beta Eta
House Corp., Inc., of Tallahassee v. Gregory, 237 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1970), the Florida
Supreme Court expressly held the Shingleton principles applied to other forms of lia-
bility insurance.
21. Bussey v. Shingleton, 211 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
591 1Florida Statutes 627.7262
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limits. 2 2 Therefore, as a real party in interest, the insurer may be joined
as a codefendant under the liberal joinder provisions of rule 1.210(a) of
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.2 Recognizing that this rule pro-
motes the goal of "providing an efficient and expeditious adjudication
of the rights of persons possessing adverse interests in a controversy, "24
the Florida Supreme Court illustrated how an injured plaintiff may be
adversely affected if he cannot immediately align the insurance com-
pany with the insured. Citing Bergh v. Canadian Universal Insurance
Co.25 and Sellers v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,2" the court
emphasized the importance of joinder to prevent defeat of a plaintiff's
recovery. Assertions of policy defenses by the insurance company based
on the possible negligence of the insured or absence of his motivation to
protect the injured party are examples of when an injured person's re-
covery is defeated.
22. Id. at 596. The court also relied heavily on briefs filed in In re Rules Gov-
erning Conduct of Attorneys in Florida, (which was referred to as Case No. 35,524 by
the Bussey court). This case involved a petition filed in 1966 by the Florida Bar Associ-
ation seeking additional rules governing the conduct of "in house" counsel; the rule
would have precluded attorneys for insurance companies from defending the insured. In
opposing the adoption of the rule, counsel for the insurance industry openly admitted
the "'direct financial interest" of the insurer ...... an identity and community of
interest in the defense of any suit brought against the insured," . . . . [and] that the
insurer. . . "has or claims an interest adverse to the plaintiff.'" Bussey v. Shingleton,
211 So. 2d at 595-96 (quoting various briefs filed in In re Rules Governing Conduct of
Attorneys in Florida, Case No. 35,524).
23. Rule 1.210 provides:
PARTIES (a) Parties Generally. Every action may be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest. . . .All persons having an interest in
the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded may join as
plaintiffs and any person may be made a defendant who has or claims an
interest adverse to the plaintiff. Any person may at any time be made a
party if his presence is necessary or proper to a complete determination of
the cause.
(emphasis added).
24. Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 718.
25. 216 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 1968). The fact that the court cited this malpractice
case was an indication that the Shingleton joinder principles were not limited to motor
vehicle liability insurers.
26. 185 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1966). This was an uninsured motorist case involving
policy questions.
592 Nova Law Journal
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After Shingleton
Shingleton's initial impact was described as "almost cataclys-
mic"'27 and as creating "near chaos in tort litigation in this State. '28
Although clearly reversing Florida law on joinder of automobile liabil-
ity insurers, Shingleton left a number of questions unanswered; 29 most
of these questions have been answered, albeit by a number of supreme
court decisions on the same issues.
In Beta Eta House Corp., Inc. of Tallahassee v. Gregory,30 while
purporting to extend the principles announced in Shingleton to other
forms of liability insurance, the court actually appeared to recede from
some of them. In Shingleton, the court had advocated a "candid admis-
sion at trial of the existence of insurance coverage, the policy limits of
same, and an otherwise aboveboard revelation of the interest of the in-
surer. . ... -1 However in Beta Eta, the court maintained that Shin-
gleton merely requires "the parties to 'lay their cards on the table' in
discovery proceedings, settlement negotiations, and pre-trial hearings.
The existence or amount of insurance coverage has no bearing on the
issues of liability and damages, and such evidence should not be consid-
ered by the jury.' '3 2 Within only a few months, the court translated
candid admissions at trial into concealment of insurance.
Furthermore, Singleton indicated that if it should clearly appear
in pretrial procedures that joinder of the insurer would interpose issues
between the insured and insurance company that would unduly compli-
cate the trial on the negligence issue, a motion to sever these issues for
separate trial could be granted.33 Yet in Beta Eta, the court held that
the trial judge may, upon motion of either party, order separate trials
27. Jurisdictional Brief for Respondent at 2, North Miami Gen. Hosp., Inc. v.
Roach, 237 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1970)(consolidated with Beta Eta for oral argument
purposes).
28. Brief for Petitioner at 8, North Miami Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Roach, 237 So. 2d
173 (Fla. 1970).
29. See generally Comment, Civil Procedure: Judicial Creation of Direct Action
Against Automobile Liability Insurers, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 145 (1969).
30. 237 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1970).
31. Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 718 (emphasis added).
32. Beta Eta, 237 So. 2d at 165 (emphasis added).
33. Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 720.
7
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whenever the insurance company is joined.3 4 Based on this holding, all
an insurer codefendant needed to do was file a timely motion to sever,
and the trial judge would grant it. Thus it appeared for a time that the
remedial principles announced in Shingleton had quickly fallen into
desuetude. 5
The severance issue was substantially resolved in Stecher v. Pome-
roy.86 After reaffirming the Shingleton conclusion that the insurer is a
real party in interest in actions to determine the insured's liability,37
the court concluded that Shingleton referred only to severance of issues
between the insured and the insurer - not on the negligence issue.
"[A] bsent a justiciable issue relating to insurance, such as a question
of coverage or of the applicability or interpretation of the insurance
policy or other such valid dispute on the matter of insurance coverage,
there is no valid reason for a severance and it should NOT be
granted." 8
In Godshall v. Unigard Insurance Co.,"9 the court further clarified
the issue of severance in holding that in absence of a justiciable issue
relating to insurance, severance could not be regarded as harmless
34. Beta Eta, 237 So. 2d at 165. The appellate court, at 230 So. 2d 495,500
(Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1970), concluded that
[p]ursuant to the provisions of this rule [Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.270(b), Separate
Trials] the trial court should on motion of a party order that the issues
relating to the cause of action sued upon be first tried under circumstances
which exclude any reference to insurance, insurance coverage or joinder in
the suit of the insurer as codefendant. After this trial has been concluded
and a verdict rendered for the plaintiff, a second trial confined solely to the
issue of insurance cverage should be held if such an issue has been raised.
If no such issue is present, judgment against the insurer within the policy
limits would follow the verdict rendered in the first trial on the merits.
(emphasis added).
35. See Beta Eta, 237 So. 2d at 166 (Boyd, J., dissenting in part and concurring
in part) ("The decision distorts the law of severance and offends equal protection and
due process by requiring special treatment of liability insurers not afforded other
codefendants").
36. 253 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1971).
37. Id. at 423. The court again cited the insurance counsel's arguments in In re
Rules Governing Conduct of Attorneys in Florida, (Case No. 35,524). See supra note
22.
38. Stecher, 253 So. 2d at 424.
39. 281 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1973).
8
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Underlying Rationale: Fear of Prejudicial Impact on Juries
The underlying rationale for prohibiting mention, and thus joinder,
of liability insurance has traditionally been the assumption that juries
are unduly swayed by knowledge that the defendant is insured.41 Sup-
posedly, such knowledge increases botl the size and number of plain-
tiff's verdicts. Based on this assumption, evidence of a defendant's lia-
bility insurance is not relevant as evidence of negligence, and is
inadmissible.42
Prior to Shingleton, Florida courts generally followed this tradi-
tional view, and held that deliberate injection of insurance into a tort
trial was prejudicial error.43 As previously noted, 4 the Shingleton court
embraced a more modern view. "[T]he stage has now been reached
40. But cf. Damico v. Lundberg. 379 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1979)(Although the circuit court erred in dismissing the defendant's insurer, it was not
reversible error. No amount of emphasizing the defendant's financial responsibility
could have countered plaintiff husband's admission of his own negligence in entering
the intersection.).
41. See, e.g., International Co. v. Clark, 147 Md. 34, 42, 127 A. 647, 650
(1925); Jeddeloh v. Hockenhull, 219 Minn. 541, 553, 18 N.W.2d 582, 589 (1945); W.
PIERSON, THE DEFENSE ATrORNEY AND BAsic DEFENSE TACTICs § 140 (1956); Ap-
pleman, Joinder of Policy Holder and Insurer as Parties Defendant, 22 MARQ. L.
REV. 75, 91 (1938); In Texas Co. v. Betterton, 126 Tex. 359, 88 S.W.2d 1039 (1936),
adherence to this assumption approached absurdity when the court reversed the plain-
tiff's judgment against one of the largest oil companies in the world because the defen-
dant's liability insurance coverage was brought to the attention of the jury.
42. Compare Jeddeloh v. Hockenhull, 219 Minn. 541, 554, 18 N.W.2d 582, 589
(1945), with Herschensohn v. Weisman, 80 N.H. 557, 558, 119 A. 705, 705 (1923)(de-
fendant's reply to a caution about his driving shortly before the accident, "Don't worry;
I carry insurance for that," was competent evidence bearing directly upon his negli-
gence). See generally C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 168
(1954); Note, Evidence: Proper disclosure during trial that defendant is insured, 26
CORNELL L.Q. 137 (1940) (discussion of exceptions to. the general rule of
inadmissibility).
43. Carls Markets v. Meyer, 69 So. 2d 789, 793 (Fla. 1953); Rose v. Peters, 82
So. 2d 585, 586 (Fla. 1955); Seminole Shell Co. v. Clearwater Flying Co., 156 So. 2d
543, 545 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
44. See supra text accompanying note 31.
595 1Florida Statutes 627.726217:1983
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where juries are more mature. '45 Although the court confusingly re-
ceded from this position in Beta Eta,'4 it concluded in Stecher v. Pome-
roy 7 that in order to "reflect the presence of financial responsibility,
. . . [the presence of the insurer as the real party in interest] should be
left apparent before the jury (without other express mention, of
course). . . .,,4 Again, the court clarified its position in Godshall v.
Unigard Insurance Co.,49 by announcing that a legitimate purpose of
joinder of the insurance company is to reflect the presence of financial
responsibility."0 "The interest which plaintiff has in presenting to the
jury the truest possible picture of the existence of financial responsibil-
ity is much too important to allow the loss of that interest .... ,51
Notwithstanding this neoteric posture of Florida courts, insurance
and defense counsel staunchly assert that injection of insurance into
trial unduly influences jury findings of liability and damages.5 2 Empiri-
cal studies do lend some support to this "prejudice theory," and to the
belief that a judge's curative instructions are ineffective. 53 On the other
45. Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 718.
46. See supra text accompanying note 32.
47. 253 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1971).
48. Id. at 424. The court reasoned:
This offsets any indulgence by counsel or the jury with unfounded argu-
ments like, "This poor, hard working truck driver and his family" ap-
proach, when in fact there is an ability to respond. It is probably not a
factor in other instances where there is an obviously responsible principal
defendant as in Compania Dominicana de Aviacion.
Id. at 423.
In Compania Dominicana de Aviacion v. Knapp, 251 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1971), the court rejected the defendant's contention that reference made during
trial to a collateral settlement by Lloyd's of London could not be remedied by a cura-
tive instruction.
49. 281 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1973).
50. Id. at 501.
51. Id. at 502.
52. See Brief for American Insurance Association, amicus curiae at 6, O'Quinn
v. Thompson, No. 52577 (Fla. 1978)(one of three consolidated cases in Markert v.
Johnston, 367 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1978)).
53. See Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744,
(1959), which reports of experiments with juries and insurance.
Where the defendant disclosed that he had no insurance the average
award of all verdicts was $33,000. Where defendant disclosed that he had
insurance but there was no objection the average award rose to $37,000.
10
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hand, evidence also exists indicating that lower awards result when in-
surance coverage is known by the jurors."s Assuming arguendo that
juries return higher awards when insurance coverage is known, no evi-
dence exists to determine whether such award is merely adequate
rather than excessive. 55 In other words, whether justice or injustice is
achieved by concealment of liability insurance coverage is an unan-
swered question.
Realism requires acceptance of the fact that most if not all juries
become aware of the defendant's insurance coverage at some point dur-
ing trial. This is particularly true in automobile litigation where the
average juror assumes, rightly or not, that an insurance company will
eventually bear the cost of an adverse judgment.56 An able plaintiff's
Where, however, the defendant said he had insurance and there was an
objection and an instruction to disregard, the average award rose to
$46,000 ...
Id. at 754. See also Neitzert, Jury Trials of Insurance Companies and Large Corpora-
tions, 18 CHI. B. REc. 87 (1937).
54. See Gladewater Laundry & Dry Cleaners v. Newman, 141 S.W.2d 951
(Tex. Civ. App. 1940)(evidence of instirance policies was introduced in the first trial,
and the jury awarded $7,500. After reversal, in the second trial in which no evidence of
insurance was permitted, the jury awarded $12,000.). See also 8 J. APPLEMAN, supra
note 11, § 4861, at n.1 ("extensive studies have demonstrated that injection of insur-
ance tends to diminish the size of jury verdicts; and states like Wisconsin which have
permitted direct action have lower verdicts than neighboring states not permitting men-
tion of the insurer's presence"); W. PIERSON, THE DEFENSE ATrORNEY AND BASIC DE-
FENSE TACTICS § 145 at 325 (1956); Note, Direct Action Statutes: Their Operational
and Conflict-of-Law Problems, 74 HARV. L. REV. 357, 358 n.12 (1960).
55. See Note, The Liability Insurer as a Real Party in Interest: Proposed
Amendments to the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, 41 MINN. L. REV. 784, 788
n.33 (1957)(Citing a letter from Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., Director of the Jury
Study Project, Jan. 8, 1957. In the Chicago Jury Study Project, interviews with experi-
mental jurors indicated the effect of insurance knowledge was to impel rendering of
what they thought was an adequate award. The absence of insurance knowledge caused
the jurors to award what they considered to be less than adequate.).
56. See Beta Eta, 237 So. 2d at 167 (Fla. 1970)(Ervin, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)
The universality of insurance protection explodes the out-moded concept
that to avoid prejudice an insured's applicable insurance must be isolated
from the jury's knowledge. The feature of insurance has become an inte-
gral factor in the modern jury's actual approach to the discharge of its role
in assessing personal injury litigation issues, notwithstanding contrary the-
11
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attorney has many "legitimate" ways of indirectly communicating to
the jury the existence of insurance. 57 Therefore, it is submitted that
arguments for and against joinder of liability insurers should not be
premised upon illusory and theoretical foundations of prejudicial im-
pact on juries.
The Power Behind Markert v. Johnston: The Supreme Court's
Rulemaking Authority
The Florida Constitution authorizes the supreme court to promul-
gate rules regulating practice and procedure in all Florida courts.5 8 In
1973, in response to the legislature's enactment of various laws which
related to practice and procedure, the court held that the mandate to
regulate practice and procedure was an exclusive grant to the supreme
court.59 The legislature may veto or repeal a court rule by a general
law enacted by a two-thirds vote in each house of the legislature,60 but
it may not amend or supersede a rule.61 If a statute is subsequently
oretical considerations. It is general public knowledge that in a world
fraught with personal risks most of our citizens have the protection of
insurance.
Accord Schevling v. Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 87, 89 (D. Conn. 1953); See also Kalven,
The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIo ST. L.J. 158,
171 (1958); Lassiter, Direct Actions. . .Against the Insurer, 1949 INs. L.J. 411, 416.
57. The most widely used method is to examine jurors on voir dire regarding
their interest in the defendant's insurance company. See, e.g., Ryan v. Noble, 95 Fla.
820, 822, 116 So. 766, 768 (1929); City of Niceville v. Hardy, 160 So. 2d 535, 538
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Purdy v. Gulf Breeze Enters., Inc., 403 So. 2d 1325,
1331 (Fla. 1981)("Since there is no longer any reason for not mentioning insurance in
front of jurors, an attorney may question prospective jurors about any possible
prejudice or bias they may have whether it be for or against insurance companies.").
58. The supreme court shall adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all
courts including the time for seeking appellate review, the administrative supervision of
all courts, the transfer to the court having jurisdiction of any proceeding when the
jurisdiction of another court has been improvidently invoked, and a requirement that
no cause shall be dismissed because an improper remedy has been sought. These rules
may be repealed by a general law enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership of
each house of the legislature. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a).
59. In re Clarification of Florida Rules of Practice & Procedure, 281 So. 2d 204,
205 (Fla. 1973).
60. See supra note 58.
61. In re Clarification, 281 So. 2d at 205.
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adopted by the court as a rule of practice and procedure, no attempt by
the legislature to amend the statute is valid.62 The supreme court has
interpreted the last sentence of article V, section 2(a)63 as requiring
knowledge and specific intent on the part of each house to override a
specific rule. 4 No such specific intent was evinced in the passage of the
Revised Insurance Code. Therefore, the re-enactment of section
627.7262 is not a constitutional repeal of rule 1.210(a).65
That neither the constitutional language nor the intent of the
framers mandates the court's holding of exclusive authority to regulate
practice and procedure has been the subject of recent commentary.66
Nevertheless, the court remains firmly entrenched in the notion of its
exclusive power to promulgate rules of practice and procedure.6 7 Nor is
Florida unique in constitutionally granting exclusive power to the su-
preme court over rules of practice and procedure.68
The Boundaries of the Court's Rulemaking Authority
It is fundamental that court rules cannot contravene constitutional
provisions, extend or abridge jurisdiction, or abrogate or modify sub-
stantive law. 69
62. Id. 1955 Fla. Laws 265, ch. 29737, § 3 similarly provided in part: "When a
rule is promulgated and adopted by the supreme court concerning practice and proce-
dure, and it conflicts with the statute, the rule supersedes the statutory provision."
63. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a).
64. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 808 (Fla. 1976)(England, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
65. See supra notes 8 & 23 and accompanying text.
66. See Means, The Power to Regulate Practice and Procedure in Florida
Courts, 32 U. FLA. L. REv. 442 (1980), for a history of the rulemaking authority and
a cogent urging of the abandonment of the idea of exclusivity.
67. See School Bd. of Broward County v. Surette, 281 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1973);
Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977);
Avila South Condominium Ass'n v. Kappa Corp., 347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1977); Markert
v. Johnston, 367 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1978); Cozine v. Tullo, 394 So. 2d 115 (1981).
68. See, e.g., ARIZ. CoNsr. art. VI, § 5; MICH. CONST. art. VI, §§ 4, 5; PA.
CONST. art. V, § 10(c). No provision is made in these constitutions for legislative veto
or repeal of court promulgated rules.
69. See Green, To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-Making Power
Prescribe Rules of Evidence?, 26 A.B.A. J. 482, 482 (1940); Joiner & Miller, Rules of
Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making, 55 MICH. L. REv. 623,
13
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The constitutional grant of the court's rulemaking authority is ex-
pressed in the terms "practice and procedure.""0 Since "practice" and
"procedure" are generally considered synonymous,7 the actual distinc-
tion is between procedural and substantive law.
Florida has drawn the boundaries, if boundaries are to be drawn,
according to the definitions expressed by Justice Adkins:
Practice and procedure pertains to the legal machinery by
which substantive law is made effective. . . .[S]ubstantive law cre-
ates, defines, adopts and regulates rights, while procedural law
prescribes the method of enforcing those rights.
... The entire area of substance and procedure may be described
as a "twilight zone" and a statute or rule will be characterized as
substantive or procedural according to the nature of the problem
for which a characterization must be made.
...Practice and procedure encompasses the course, form, manner,
means, method, mode, order, process or steps by which a party en-
forces substantive rights or obtains redress for their invasion.
"Practice and procedure" may be described as the machinery of
the judicial process as opposed to the product thereof.
.. .The term "rules of practice and procedure" includes all rules
governing the parties, their counsel and the Court throughout the
progress of the case from the time of its initiation until final judg-
ment and its execution. 2
These broad statements supposedly define the distinction between
substance and procedure. Article II, section 373 expressly restricts the
exercise of authority by one branch in areas of power belonging to an-
other. Since the supreme court has exclusive authority over practice
and procedure,74 the legislature may not enact statutes which are pro-
cedural.75 If the subject matter is substantive, the legislature may act
634 (1957).
70. See supra note 58.
71. Poyser v. Minors, 7 Q.B.D. 329, 334 (1881).
72. In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65, 65 (Fla.
1972)(Adkins, J., concurring).
73. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3, Branches of Government. See supra note 4.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 59-62.
75. Chappell v. Florida Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 391 So. 2d
14
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upon it.7 8
Joinder of Liability Insurers: Substantive or Procedural
One Shingleton question remains unanswered: whether joinder and
nonjoinder of liability insurers is procedural or substantive? The an-
swer is of paramount importance in determining whether the new stat-
ute will withstand supreme court scrutiny, as undoubtedly the issue will
be decided there. If joinder of insurers is deemed procedural and in
conflict with rule 1.210(a),"8 the statute will be struck as an invasion of
the supreme court's exclusive rulemaking authority. 9 If joinder (and
nonjoinder under the new statute) is deemed to involve substantive
rights, the legislature has acted within its authority, and the statute
will be held valid.
Unfortunately, when squarely faced with an opportunity to resolve
this issue, the court demurred. Instead, the court in Markert v. John-
ston"0 decided that resolution of the issue was not essential since the
language of the statute provided "rather clearly that joinder of insurers
is merely a procedural step in the conduct of a motor vehicle tort law-
suit." 81 The statute before the court8O 2 provided for both nonjoinder, at
the commencement of the suit, and joinder, at a later stage. Consistent
358 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Military Park Fire Control Tax Dist. No. 4 v.
DeMarios, 407 So. 2d 1020, 1021 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981). See cases cited supra
note 67.
76. See supra note 75.
77. Since the effective date of the re-enactment of the nonjoinder statute, Florida
circuit courts have been deluged with defendant liability insurers' motions to dismiss in
reliance on the new statute. To the author's knowledge, most courts have denied the
motions and concluded that the new statute is unconstitutional under the authority of
Markert v. Johnston, 367 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1978). See, e.g., Shields v. Richardson, No.
82-3503-CA (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct. Oct. 8, 1982); Feldman v. Boyd, No. 81-5515-
CA(L)01-C (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Dec. 9, 1982); Scioli v. McClean Trucking Co., No. 82-
632 CA-10 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Dec. 29, 1982); Shurtleff v. Sunstream Equip. Co., Inc.,
No. 82-5578 CA(L)01-K (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Jan. 12, 1983); Moran-Hernandez v.
North East Ins. Co., No. 82-3455 CA(L)01-B (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Jan. 17, 1983).
78. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.210(a), see supra note 23.
79. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3, and art. V, § 2(a).
80. 367 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1978).
81. Id. at 1005.
82. See supra note 1.
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with Shingleton, the insurer would at some point be joined. The statute
thus attempted to control the "timing of joinder during the course of a
trial, . . . [which] is, without question, a matter of practice or proce-
dure. .... "83 However, in his specially concurring opinion advocating
adoption of the substance of the invalid statute as a court rule, Justice
Alderman indicated that joinder or nonjoinder, not merely timing of
joinder, of insurers is procedural.8
Two years later, in Cozine v. Tullo,85 the court again faced the
issue with an equivalent statute prohibiting joinder of all liability insur-
ers. 86 Similarly begging the substantive-procedural question, the major-
ity held the statue unconstitutional "[flor the reasons expressed in
Markert v. Johnston. . . . 11 In his dissent, Justice McDonald ex-
pressed the view that neither section 627.7262(1)88 nor section
768.04589 was entirely procedural so as to encroach upon the court's
exlusive domain. In concluding that "substantive rights are affected by
the nonjoinder statutes,"90 he relied upon specific language in Shin-
gleton,91 and the fact that the insurance industry and the plaintiffs' bar
show such opposing interests in the joinder issue. This "fact" is un-
doubtedly correct. However, such reasoning does not compel the con-
clusion that nonjoinder statutes are substantive rather than procedural.
83. Markert, 367 So. 2d at 1006.
84. Id. See also, Piccolo v. Hertz Corp., 421 So. 2d 535, 536 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1982)("The question of joinder is different from the question of whether a suit
may be maintained in the first place; the former is procedural, whereas the latter is
substantive.")
85. 394 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1981).
86. FLA. STAT. § 768.045 (1977). The principal difference from section 627.7262
(1977) was the inclusion of "liability" in the title, and the exclusion of "motor vehicle"
in the first sentence.
87. 394 So. 2d at 115 (1981).
88. FLA. STAT. § 627.7262 (1977).
89. FLA. STAT. § 768.045 (1977).
90. Cozine, 394 So. 2d at 116.
91. [U]nless the legislature in the exercise of its police power regulation of
insurance, affirmatively gives insurers the substantive right to insert "no
joinder" clauses in liability policies there is no basis in law for insurers to
assume they have such contractual rights as a special privilege not granted
other citizens to contract immunity with their insureds from being sued as
joint defendants by strangers.
Id. (quoting Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 718-19 (Fla. 1969)).
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The fact that the joinder issue is considered crucial does not render it
substantive. Furthermore, the Shingleton logic supports the conclusion
that there was no alteration of substantive law.92
The court's refusal to resolve the substantive-procedural contro-
versy involved in nonjoinder statutes impels extraction of its views on
the issue from other cases. Virtually all of these decisions rely on prin-
ciples announced in Shingleton.
The Beta Eta decision shed the first light on the substantive-proce-
dural issue. By affirming the decision of the first district,93 the supreme
court impliedly accepted the statement that the Shingleton decisions
"were not intended to nor do they have the effect of changing the sub-
stantive law of this state. These decisions have merely created a proce-
dural innovation which permits a direct action against a liability insur-
ance carrier as a codefendant in a suit brought against its
insured. . . ." Since the supreme court modified the district court's
decision on the severance issue,95 a debatable question existed as to the
supreme court's approval of the district court's statement that the sub-
stantive law of Florida prohibits any reference at trial to the defen-
dant's insurance coverage. (Joinder of the insurer necessarily involves
reference at trial to the defendant's insurance coverage).
The next venture into the "twilight zone" of substance and proce-
dure as it relates to joinder of insurers was in School Board of Brow-
ard County v. Surette.9" At issue was section 455.06(2), Florida Stat-
utes,97 which dealt with the liability and insurance of local
governmental units. Pursuant to the statute, a condition precedent to
automatic partial waiver of governmental immunity was that no at-
tempt to suggest the existence of insurance be made at trial. The su-
92. See Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 718. The case was based primarily upon the
joinder provisions of 1.210(a) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. See supra note
23 and accompanying text.
93. Beta Eta House Corp., Inc. of Tallahassee v. Gregory, 230 So. 2d 495 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
94. Id. at 499 (emphasis added). Accord Durrett v. Davidson, 239 So. 2d 46, 48
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Kephart v. Pickens, 271 So. 2d 163, 164 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1972).
95. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
96. 281 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1973).
97. FLA. STAT. § 455.06(2)(1977).
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preme court agreed this provision was unconstitutional as contrary to
article V, section 2(a), 98 in light of the joinder and severance rules.
"This portion of Fla. Stat. § 455.06(2) which provides for severance of
a political body's insurer relates to joinder and severance, truly a proce-
dural matter, and is therefore superseded and rendered ineffec-
tive. . ... -9 Although the invalid portion of the statute referred to ref-
erences to insurance at trial, the court did not discuss any substantive
rights, indicating that none was involved. Thus it appeared the Beta
Eta district court's statements that references to insurance involved
substantive law were not accepted by the supreme court.
This became explicitly clear in Carter v. Sparkman,100 where the
court confronted another statute prohibiting references to insurance.
Section 768.47(1), Florida Statutes,101 prohibited "any reference to in-
surance, insurance coverage or joinder of an insurer as a codefendant in
the suit. °1 0 2 The court concluded the legislature intended only to bar
"any reference" to joinder of insurers rather than joinder itself.103 Fur-
thermore, the court held that "references" to insurance or insurance
companies during the course of a trial "is a purely procedural matter
having to do with the conduct of trial proceedings. To the extent the
Legislature has attempted to control 'references' during the course of
trial . . . it has acted beyond its power." 1 4
In School Board of Broward County v. Price,10 5 the court stated
98. FLA. STAT. art V, § 2(a).
99. Surette, 281 So. 2d at 483.
100. 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
101. FLA. STAT. § 768.47(1)(1977), formerly FLA. STAT. § 768.134(1)(1975),
enacted as part of the Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975.
102. FLA. STAT. § 768.47(1), formerly FLA. STAT. § 768.134(1).
103. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 806 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1041 (1977). The court could have addressed the substantive-procedural aspect of
joinder here too.
104. Id. at 806(Fla. 1976)(footnote omitted). In view of the legislature's special
finding of a "crisis" in skyrocketing medical malpractice premiums (Preamble to ch.
75-9, 1975 Fla. Laws 15), the court adopted the substance of the "reference" provision
as rule 1.450(c) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Adoption of a nonjoinder rule
was unsuccessfully urged upon the Markert court. See Brief for Respondent at 14,
Markert v. Johnston, 367 So. 2d 1003 (1978).
105. 362 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 1978).
1604 7:19831
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specifically it was receding from the Surette1 08 holding. Section
230.23(9)(d)(2), Florida Statutes,0 7 contains a provision substantially
identical to the statute in Surette and conditions waiver of governmen-
tal immunity upon no suggestion at trial of the existence of insurance.
Adhering to the precedent of Surette,108 Sparkman,109 and Godshall,110
the Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded the statute was uncon-
stitutional. In its reversal, the supreme court distinguished the Spark-
man statute since it was "part of an enactment, under the Legislature's
police power, to meet a public health crisis in Florida. The prohibition
of insurance references at trial, although undoubtedly designed to re-
duce the crisis, was clearly not part of any substantive right."' " Fur-
thermore, the statute at issue in Price waives sovereign immunity for
school boards. This is specifically within the constitutional power of the
legislature.112 The prohibition of the statute "sets the bounds of the
substantive right to sue a political subdivision of the State."11 3 Thus,
the legislature's constitutional authority to waive sovereign immunity
and its implicit power to condition the waiver "saved" the statute by
injecting substantive rights.1 4
Although not involving insurance companies, Avila South Condo-
minium Association, Inc. v. Kappa Corp.,115 also sheds light on the
court's views of substance and procedure. The court held that the legis-
lative attempt to confer standing on a condominium association to
bring a class action on behalf of its members was an impermissible
violation of article V, section 2(a). Citing Justice Adkin's standard for
106. 281 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1973).
107. FLA. STAT. § 230.23(9)(2) (1979).
108. 281 So. 2d 481.
109. 335 So. 2d 802.
110. Godshall v. Unigard Ins. Co., 281 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1973).
111. Price, 362 So. 2d at 1339.
112. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 13 authorizes the legislature to enact provisions for
bringing suit against the state.
113. Price, 362 So. 2d at 1339.
114. The court "excused" the incompatible Surette decision because it didn't ap-
pear that this constitutional argument had been advanced before the Surette court. On
the contrary, this argument was cogently urged upon the court. See Reply Brief for
Petitioner at 3-5, and Brief for Amicus Curiae at 4, School Bd. of Broward County v.
Surette, 281 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1973).
115. 347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1977).
6051
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distinguishing between substance and procedure,11 the court concluded
that "[e]ssentially the statutory sections seek to define the proper par-
ties in suits litigating substantive rights. Clearly this has to do with 'the
machinery of the judicial process as opposed to the product
thereof.' ,117
These decisions indicate the court continues to adhere to "strict"
substantive-procedural definitions. The fact that a rule of procedure
may reflect prevailing public policy does not enable the legislature to
invade the court's rulemaking authority.1 8 The court has specifically
stated that joinder is truly a procedural matter,119 that references at
trial to insurance coverage is clearly not part of any substantive
right, 20 and that the determination of proper parties in suits litigating
substantive rights is a procedural matter.121
The New Statute - Section 627.7262
The new section was "substantially reworded to permit insurers to
insert non-joinder clauses in their contracts.1 22 Subsection (1) states,
in essence, that a plaintiff may not sue a liability insurer until a judg-
ment first has been obtained against the insured for a cause of action
covered by the policy. Subsection (2) provides that no person shall be
considered a third party beneficiary under a liability insurance policy
until a judgment first has been obtained against the insured for a cause
of action covered by the policy. Subsection (3) "affirmatively" grants to
insurers the "substantive" right to include provisions in policies which
preclude a noninsured person from filing an action against the insurer
until a judgment first has been obtained against the insured for a cause
116. See supra text accompanying note 72.
117. 347 So.. 2d at 608. Observing that "the peculiar features of condominium
development, ownership, and operation indicate the wisdom of providing a procedural
vehicle for settlement of disputes affecting condominium owners,. . ." the court
adopted the substance of the stricken statute as Rule 1.220 of the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure. Id.
118. See Markert, 367 So. 2d at 1005, n.8.
119. See supra text accompanying note 104.
120. See supra text accompanying note 111.
121. See supra text accompanying note 117.
122. STAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at 92.
1 606 Nova Law Journal
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of action which is covered by the policy.12
Subsections (1) and (2) are in direct opposition to Shingleton prin-
ciples. The Shingleton court viewed the injured party's cause of action
against the insurer as vesting in or accruing at the same time the party
becomes entitled to sue the insured. 24 Thus, initial joinder was permis-
sible. Subsection (2) is an attempt to abrogate the third party benefi-
ciary principles first articulated in Shingleton. As previously dis-
cussed,25 Shingleton and Beta Eta established that liability insurance
is secured with the intent to benefit injured third parties. Based on this
doctrine, joinder of liability insurers was permissible.
At first blush, subsection (3) appears to receive support from Shin-
gleton. The Shingleton court noted that the joinder rule "raises the
presumption that unless the Legislature in the exercise of its police
power regulation of insurance, affirmatively gives insurers the substan-
tive right to insert 'no joinder' clauses in liability policies there is no
basis in law for insurers to assume they have such contractual
right. .... ,,126 However, much of the opinion indicates that the legisla-
ture cannot constitutionally grant such right to the insurance compa-
nies. In striking these no joinder clauses, the court relied upon the Flor-
123. By use of the terminology "for a cause of action which is covered by such
policy," the statute should have no effect on an injured person's right to bring a direct
action against the insurer for recovery of judgment in excess of policy limits, based on
alleged fraud or bad faith of insurer in conduct or handling of suit. See, e.g., Thompson
v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. of New York, 250 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1971); Boston Old
Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 388 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 922
(1981); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Perez, 384 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
124. Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 716. Accord Travelers Ins. Co. v. Perez, 384 So.
2d 971, 973 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980). But cf. Davis v. Williams 239 So. 2d 593,
595 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970) and Clemons v. Flagler Hosp., Inc., 385 So. 2d
1134, 1135-36 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980)(for statute of limitations purposes, the
injured party's cause of action against the insurer does not accrue until entry of judg-
ment against the tortfeasor).
125. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
126. Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 718-19 (Fla. 1969). But see J. Drew's dissenting
opinion at page 722 ("The majority opinion, in relying solely upon Rule 1.210. . .and
our rule-making power under the Constitution for the conclusion there reached neces-
sarily holds that the Legislature is wholly devoid of power to enact laws prohibiting
joinder of insurance companies as parties defendant under the circumstances presented
in this case.").
607 1Florida Statutes 627.7262
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ida Constitution's guarantee of access to the courts. 2 7 Furthermore, in
discussing the procedural effects of these clauses, whereby a plaintiff
would have to first recover a judgment against the tortfeasor and then
file another action against the insurance company to enforce the judg-
ment, the court stated:
The unfettered right of a plaintiff to sue defendants jointly is so
universal and essential to due process that it can rarely be cur-
tailed or restricted by private contract between potential
defendants.
...It is an anomaly in the law and discriminatory for parties
to a contract to attempt to deny nonconsenting members of the
public a full, complete, adequate remedy at law which is constitu-
tionally guaranteed all citizens.
. . . [I]t seems anomalous to public policy to procedurally
sanction and condone a situation where the ultimate beneficiary of
policy proceeds is deprived by a provision in the policy of an open,
speedy and realistic opportunity to pursue by due process his right
of an adequate remedy at law jointly against the insured and
insurer.128
The constitutional overtones are clear. If due process is violated by
the insertion of nonjoinder clauses in insurance policies, the fact that
the legislature grants the power to do so does not eliminate the viola-
tion. In other words, the legislature has no more authority to violate
due process than have insurance companies. 29
127. Id. at 718.("The insured and the insurer cannot constitutionally contract
away or postpone the speedy and adequate remedy the law affords a third party, nor
impose unusual limitations upon the latter's right to jointly sue adverse parties.").
128. Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 717-19 (emphasis added).
129. If a law is passed by unanimous legislature, clamoured for by the
general voice of the public, and a cause is before [a judge] on it, in which
the whole community is on one side and an individual nameless or odious
on the other, and he believe it to be against the constitution, he must so
declare it, - or there is no judge.
Brief for Respondent at 5, O'Quinn v. Thompson, 367 So. 2d 1003(Fla. 1978)(consoli-
dated case in Markert)(quoting address of Attorney General Rufus Choate, given
before the Constitutional Convention of 1853).
Nova Law Journal 7:1983
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Conclusion
Most likely the court will scrutinize the new statute to determine
whether it is substantive or procedural. Although the word "nonjoin-
der" has been excluded from the text of the statute, 3 ' the effect of the
new statute is identical to that of the old statute: to prohibit initial
joinder of the insurer by making a judgment against the insured a con-
dition precedent to maintenance of a cause of action against the in-
surer. As such, the legislature has again attempted to prescribe the
timing of joinder. The supreme court has clearly held that any such
attempt is an unconstitutional usurpation by the legislature of the judi-
cial function. The new statute, like the old, will not withstand judicial
scrutiny on this point.
Liability insurers control the litigation, choose the attorneys, de-
fend the case, and have a direct financial interest in the outcome. The
Florida judiciary has recognized that realism dictates continued ac-
knowledgement of liability insurers as real parties in interest in actions
to determine the insured's liability. Keeping this reality in mind, the
court should directly address the substantive-procedural issue and make
a definitive statement. Since Shingleton, the court has not expressed a
clear policy, and in fact has gone to great lengths to avoid the issue.
Should the court determine the new statute substantive rather than
procedural, the due process issues expressed in Shingleton surely de-
serve further attention - much more than the court has been willing
to give.
Ilene D. Napp
130. The statute is still entitled "Nonjoinder of Insurers". FLA. CONST. art. III,
§ 6 requires the text of a statute to come within the scope of its title.
6091Florida Statutes 627.7262
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